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(Original Signature of Member)

119TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. _____

To require a full review of the bilateral relationship between the United States and South Africa and identify South African government officials and ANC leaders eligible for the imposition of sanctions, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. JACKSON of Texas introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on _____

A BILL

To require a full review of the bilateral relationship between the United States and South Africa and identify South African government officials and ANC leaders eligible for the imposition of sanctions, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “U.S.-South Africa Bi-
5 lateral Relations Review Act of 2025”.

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 Congress finds the following:

3 (1) The actions of factions within the African
4 National Congress (ANC), the political party that
5 since 1994 has held a governing majority and con-
6 trolled South Africa's executive branch, are incon-
7 sistent with the South African Government's publicly
8 stated policy of nonalignment in international af-
9 fairs.

10 (2) The South African Government has a his-
11 tory of siding with malign actors, including Hamas,
12 a United States designated Foreign Terrorist Orga-
13 nization and a proxy of the Iranian regime, and con-
14 tinues to pursue closer ties with the People's Repub-
15 lic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation.

16 (3) The South African Government's support of
17 Hamas dates back to 1994, when the ANC first
18 came into power, taking a hardline stance of consist-
19 ently accusing Israel of practicing apartheid.

20 (4) Following the unprovoked and unprece-
21 dented horrendous attack by Hamas on Israel on
22 October 7, 2023, where Hamas terrorists killed and
23 kidnapped hundreds of Israelis, members of the
24 South African Government and leaders of the ANC
25 have delivered a variety of antisemitic and anti-
26 Israel-related statements and actions, including—

1 (A) on October 7, 2023, South Africa’s
2 Foreign Ministry released a statement express-
3 ing concern of “escalating violence”, urging
4 Israel’s restraint in response, and implicitly
5 blaming Israel for provoking the attack through
6 “continued illegal occupation of Palestine land,
7 continued settlement expansion, desecration of
8 the Al Aqsa Mosque and Christian holy sites,
9 and ongoing oppression of the Palestinian peo-
10 ple”;

11 (B) on October 8, 2023, the ANC’s na-
12 tional spokesperson, Mahlengi Bhengu-Motsiri,
13 said of the devastating Hamas attack, “the de-
14 cision by Palestinians to respond to the bru-
15 tality of the settler Israeli apartheid regime is
16 unsurprising”;

17 (C) on October 14, 2023, President Cyril
18 Ramaphosa of South Africa, accused Israel of
19 “genocide” in statements during a pro-Pales-
20 tinian rally;

21 (D) on October 17, 2023, South African
22 Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor accepted a call
23 with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh;

24 (E) on October 22, 2023, South African
25 Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor visited Tehran

1 and met with President Raisi of the Islamic Re-
2 public of Iran, which is actively funding Hamas;

3 (F) on November 7, 2023, in a parliamen-
4 tary address, Foreign Minister Pandor called
5 for the International Criminal Court to issue an
6 immediate arrest warrant charging Israeli
7 Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with vio-
8 lations of international criminal law;

9 (G) on November 17, 2023, South Africa,
10 along with 4 other countries, submitted a joint
11 request to the International Criminal Court for
12 an investigation into alleged war crimes being
13 committed in the Palestinian territories;

14 (H) on December 5, 2023, the ANC hosted
15 3 members of Hamas in Pretoria, including
16 Khaled Qaddoumi, Hamas's representative to
17 Iran, and Bassem Naim, a member of Hamas's
18 political bureau in Gaza;

19 (I) on December 29, 2023, South Africa
20 filed a politically motivated suit in the Inter-
21 national Court of Justice wrongfully accusing
22 Israel of committing genocide; and

23 (J) in March 2024, South African Foreign
24 Minister Pandor was quoted saying South Afri-
25 ca will arrest Israeli-South Africans who are

1 fighting in the Israeli Defense Forces upon
2 their return home and could strip them of their
3 South African citizenship. Minister Pandor also
4 implicitly encouraged protests outside of the
5 United States Embassy;

6 (K) on October 7, 2024, the ANC com-
7 memorated only the Palestinian lives lost to
8 Israel, while accusing Israel of genocide;

9 (L) in October 2024, South Africa filed its
10 Memorial to the International Court of Justice,
11 accusing Israel of genocidal actions to depopu-
12 late Gaza through mass death and displace-
13 ment;

14 (M) in November 2024, South Africa ap-
15 pointed Ebrahim Rasool as their Ambassador to
16 the United States, who previously hosted senior
17 Hamas officials to South Africa when he was
18 the Premier of the Western Cape and, in 2020,
19 was a speaker at an annual event hosted by the
20 Iranian regime to celebrate Hezbollah's resist-
21 ance against Israel; and

22 (N) the ANC's ongoing attempt to rename
23 the street that the United States Consulate in
24 Johannesburg is located on as "Leila Khaled
25 Drive", including a quote from ANC first dep-

1 uty secretary general Nomvula Mokonyane say-
2 ing “we want the United States of America em-
3 bassy to change their letterhead to Number 1
4 Leila Khaled Drive”.

5 (5) The South African Government and the
6 ANC have maintained close relations with the Rus-
7 sian Federation, which has been accused of pepe-
8 trating war crimes in Ukraine and indiscriminately
9 undermines human rights. South Africa’s robust re-
10 lationship with Russia spans the military and polit-
11 ical space, including—

12 (A) allowing a United States-sanctioned
13 Russian cargo ship, the Lady R, to dock and
14 transfer arms at a South African naval base in
15 December 2022;

16 (B) hosting offshore naval exercises, enti-
17 tled “Operation Mosi II”, carried out jointly
18 with the PRC and Russia, between February 17
19 and 27, 2023, corresponding with the 1-year
20 anniversary of Russia’s unjustified and
21 unprovoked invasion of Ukraine;

22 (C) authorizing a United States-sanctioned
23 Russian military cargo airplane to land at a
24 South African Air Force Base;

1 (D) reneging on its initial call for the Rus-
2 sian Federation to immediately withdraw its
3 forces from Ukraine and actively seeking im-
4 proved relations with Moscow since February
5 2022;

6 (E) dispatching multiple high-level official
7 delegations to Russia to further political, intel-
8 ligence, and military cooperation;

9 (F) United States sanctioned oligarch
10 Viktor Vekselberg donating \$826,000 to the
11 ANC in 2022; and

12 (G) the ANC publishing an article in their
13 newspaper, ANC Today, in October 2024 pro-
14 moting Russian propaganda about the war in
15 Ukraine.

16 (6) South African Government interactions with
17 the PRC Government and ANC interactions with the
18 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), who are commit-
19 ting gross violations of human rights in the Xinjiang
20 province and implement economically coercive tactics
21 around the globe, undermine South Africa's demo-
22 cratic constitutional system of governance, as exem-
23 plified in—

24 (A) ongoing ANC and CCP inter-party co-
25 operation, especially with the fundamental in-

1 compatibility between the civil and democratic
2 rights guaranteed in South Africa's Constitu-
3 tion and the CCP's routine suppression of free
4 expression and individual rights;

5 (B) allowing the private Test Flying Acad-
6 emy of South Africa, which the Department of
7 Commerce added to the Entity List on June
8 12, 2023, to recruit former United States and
9 NATO fighter pilots to train Chinese People's
10 Liberation Army pilots;

11 (C) South Africa's hosting of 6 PRC Gov-
12 ernment-backed and CCP-linked Confucius In-
13 stitutes, a type of entity that a CCP official
14 characterized as an "important part of the
15 CCP's external propaganda structure", the
16 most of any country in Africa;

17 (D) South African Government support
18 for, and ANC participation in, a political train-
19 ing school opened in Tanzania funded by the
20 Chinese Communist Party where it trains polit-
21 ical members of the ruling liberation movements
22 in 6 Southern African countries. The school in-
23 stills CCP ideology into the next-generation of
24 African leaders and attempts to export the

1 CCP's system of party-run authoritarian gov-
2 ernance to the African continent;

3 (E) cooperation with the PRC under the
4 PRC's global Belt and Road Initiative which,
5 while trade and infrastructure-focused, is de-
6 signed to expand PRC global economic, polit-
7 ical, and security sector-related influence;

8 (F) the widespread presence in South Afri-
9 ca's media and technology sectors of PRC state
10 linked firms that the United States has re-
11 stricted due to threats to national security, in-
12 cluding Huawei Technologies, ZTE and
13 Hikvision, which place South African sov-
14 ereignty at risk and facilitate the CCP's export
15 of its model of digitally aided authoritarian gov-
16 ernance underpinned by cyber controls, social
17 monitoring, propaganda, and surveillance; and

18 (G) the South African government's clear
19 appeasement to the CCP in demanding that
20 Taiwan relocate its representative office out of
21 Pretoria and downgrade its status to that of a
22 trade office.

23 (7) The ANC-led South African Government
24 has a history of substantially mismanaging a range
25 of state resources and has often proven incapable of

1 effectively delivering public services, threatening the
2 South African people and the South African econ-
3 omy, as illustrated by—

4 (A) President Cyril Ramaphosa’s February
5 9, 2023, declaration of a national state of dis-
6 aster over the worsening, multi-year power cri-
7 sis caused by the ANC’s chronic mismanage-
8 ment of the state-owned power company
9 Eskom, resulting from endemic, high-level cor-
10 ruption;

11 (B) the persistence of South African state-
12 owned railway company Transnet’s insufficient
13 capacity, which has disrupted rail operations
14 and hindered mining companies’ export of iron
15 ore, coal, and other commodities, in part due to
16 malfeasance and corruption by former Transnet
17 officials;

18 (C) outbreaks of cholera in 2023 and
19 2024, the worst in 15 years, which were due in
20 part to the South African Government’s disease
21 prevention failures, as President Ramaphosa
22 admitted on June 9, 2023, including a failure
23 to provide clean water to households; and

24 (D) rampant state capture, that emerged
25 and grew during the administration of former

1 President Jacob Zuma and has damaged South
2 Africa’s international standing and profoundly
3 undermined the rule of law, continues to nega-
4 tively impact the economic development pros-
5 pects and living standards of the South African
6 people while deeply damaging public trust in
7 state governance.

8 (8) In November 2024, South Africa appointed
9 Ebrahim Rasool as Ambassador to the United
10 States. Rasool had previously made public comments
11 describing President Trump as “extreme” and in
12 March 2025, Rasool characterized President Trump
13 as “a white supremacist”. Secretary of State Marco
14 Rubio subsequently declared Rasool as persona non
15 grata in the United States.

16 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

17 It is the sense of Congress that—

18 (1) it is in the national security interest of the
19 United States to deter strategic political and secu-
20 rity cooperation and information sharing with the
21 PRC and the Russian Federation, particularly any
22 form of cooperation that may aid or abet Russia’s
23 war of aggression on Ukraine or its international
24 standing or influence; and

1 (2) the South African Government's foreign pol-
2 icy actions have long ceased to reflect its stated
3 stance of nonalignment, and now directly favor the
4 PRC, the Russian Federation, and Hamas, a known
5 proxy of Iran, and thereby undermine United States
6 national security and foreign policy interests.

7 **SEC. 4. PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION OF DETERMINA-**
8 **TION WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH AFRICA.**

9 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 30 days after the
10 date of enactment of this Act, the President, in consulta-
11 tion with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of De-
12 fense, shall certify to the appropriate congressional com-
13 mittees and release publicly an unclassified determination
14 explicitly stating whether South Africa has engaged in ac-
15 tivities that undermine United States national security or
16 foreign policy interests.

17 (b) **ACCOMPANYING REPORT.**—The certification re-
18 quired by subsection (a) shall be accompanied by an un-
19 classified report submitted to the appropriate congress-
20 sional committees, with a classified annex if necessary,
21 providing the justification for the determination.

22 **SEC. 5. FULL REVIEW OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.**

23 (a) **BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP REVIEW.**—The Presi-
24 dent, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Sec-
25 retary of Defense, the United States Trade Representa-

1 tive, and the heads of other Federal departments and
2 agencies that play a substantial role in United States rela-
3 tions with South Africa, shall conduct a comprehensive re-
4 view of the bilateral relationship between the United
5 States and South Africa.

6 (b) REPORT ON FINDINGS.—Not later than 120 days
7 after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall
8 submit to the appropriate congressional committees a re-
9 port that includes the findings of the review required by
10 subsection (a).

11 **SEC. 6. REPORT ON SANCTIONABLE PERSONS.**

12 Not later than 120 days after the date of the enact-
13 ment of this Act, the President, in consultation with the
14 Secretary of State and the Secretary of Treasury, shall
15 submit to the appropriate congressional committees a clas-
16 sified report that includes—

17 (1) a list of senior South African government
18 officials and ANC leaders the President determines
19 have engaged in corruption or human rights abuses
20 that would be sufficient, based on credible evidence,
21 to meet the criteria for the imposition of sanctions
22 pursuant to the authorities provided by the Global
23 Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (22
24 U.S.C. 10101 et seq.); and

1 (2) with respect to each person identified pur-
2 suant to paragraph (1)—

3 (A) a detailed explanation describing the
4 conduct forming the basis of the person’s inclu-
5 sion on the list; and

6 (B)(i) the expected timeline for sanctions
7 described in paragraph (1) to be imposed with
8 respect to such person; or

9 (ii) if the President does not intend to
10 impose sanctions with respect to such per-
11 son, a detailed justification describing the
12 rationale and legal authorities underlying
13 such negative determination.

14 **SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.**

15 (a) ANC.—The term “ANC” means the African Na-
16 tional Congress.

17 (b) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—

18 The term “appropriate congressional committees”
19 means—

20 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
21 House of Representatives; and

22 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
23 Senate.

24 (c) CCP.—The term “CCP” means the Chinese Com-
25 munist Party.

1 (d) PRC.—The term “PRC” means the People’s Re-
2 public of China.